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and uses instead a signal-extraction approach to
determine the market’s reaction without condi-
tioning on this information. His elegant approach
allows the market’s reaction to be estimated using
the entire sample, not just event days. Moreover,
the approach allows for the measurement of finan-
cial markets’ response to evolving expectations
of future Fed actions, a feature that allows him
to extract information even when the Fed does
not surprise the markets.
The analysis focuses on the response of term
interest rates, as in Kuttner (2001), although there
is no reason the same approach could not also be
applied to stock prices or exchange rates. The
paper’s key empirical results largely confirm those
reported elsewhere, which is good news for those
of us who have used the much simpler event-study
approach. The response of term interest rates to
changes in the funds rate is uniformly less than
one for one, and the effect on longer-term interest
rates is generally less than it is for short-term rates.
It is interesting to note, however, that this latter
tendency is less pronounced than it is in Kuttner’s
(2001) results.
My discussion will focus on two issues. The
first point is somewhat technical, as it concerns
the details of how the “noise” in the federal funds
rate is modeled. The second is a more conceptual
discussion of how the interpretation of the shocks
identified by Hamilton’s procedure might differ
from those in conventional event-study analyses.
R
ecent efforts to understand the trans-
mission of monetary policy have
spawned a growing literature exam-
ining the response of financial mar-
kets to monetary policy.1 Most of these studies
assess the likely impact of unanticipated
changes in the target federal funds rate, typically
in a sample of well-defined policy “events” con-
sisting of Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meeting days, plus the days of
unscheduled funds rate changes. The problem
is that economists do not always know the days
on which the policy actions took place, espe-
cially in the early 1990s. Before the FOMC
began announcing its policy actions in February
1994, there was often some confusion in the
financial markets as to whether there had been a
change in the funds rate target. This ambiguity
has been largely dispelled by the FOMC’s
announcements, although, as Hamilton (2008)
notes, there has been occasional speculation
that the Fed has surreptitiously changed the tar-
get rate.2
Hamilton’s (2008) paper is primarily an effort
to address the issue of unknown event dates. It
departs from the usual assumption that the days
of policy actions (or possible actions) are known
1 The first paper in this literature was Cook and Hahn (1989).
Subsequent work includes Poole and Rasche (2000), Kuttner
(2001), Poole, Rasche, and Thornton (2002), Gürkaynak, Sack,
and Swanson (2005), and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005).
2 So far, none of this speculation has proved to be correct.
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Unlike the more common event-study analysis,
Hamilton’s signal-extraction method requires sta-
tistically modeling the noise process present in
the daily effective federal funds rate.3 Intuitively,
the reason for this is that calculating the likely
signal present in any given funds rate change
requires some estimate as to the amount of noise
likely to be present on any given day: The noisier
the effective funds rate, the less likely it is that
the observed change in the rate (and, by extension,
the expected rate implied by the current-month
futures contract) represents a policy change.
Observing that the magnitude of these devia-
tions tends to increase over the course of a month,
Hamilton models the targeting error as an auto-
regressive process whose innovation variance is
a linear function of the day of the month (equa-
tions (8) and (9)). To get a sense of the magnitude
of these targeting errors, his estimated parameters
imply a 45-basis-point standard deviation on the
31st day of the month, 34 basis points on the 30th
day, and 17 basis points on the 1st day.
Although this is not an unreasonable first
pass, some refinements are possible. First, because
there is no reason to think that the end-of-month
volatility in 31-day months is greater than it is
for 30-day months, it would be desirable to relax
the assumption of 31-day months and replace
equation (9) with
where Ni is the number of days in month i.
A second important refinement would be to
account for the “settlement Wednesday” effect.
Especially in the early part of the sample, the
Wednesdays associated with the final day of the
reserve maintenance period were often associated
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Figure 1
The Target and Effective Funds Rates, 1995
NOTE: Vertical lines denote settlement Wednesdays.
3 This noise results from the fact that the New York Fed’s control
over the funds rate is not absolute: Their Trading Desk injects just
enough reserves to hit the target funds rate, given its assessment of
the factors affecting reserve demand and supply. However, because
of unanticipated changes in demand or supply, the actual (“effec-
tive”) funds rate may differ from the target.with extremely large funds rate spikes, as shown
in Figure 1. (The vertical lines denote settlement
Wednesdays.) To account for this pattern, a rea-
sonable specification for the targeting error might
be something like
where Wd is a dummy equal to 1 on settlement
Wednesdays and Md is a dummy equal to 1 on
the last day of the month. The other notation is
the same as Hamilton’s.4
Three features of this alternative specification
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significant level effects associated with settlement
Wednesdays and with the last day of the month:
Errors on these days tend to be positive. The sec-
ond is that the standard deviation of the targeting
error is 27 basis points higher on settlement
Wednesdays. Third, unlike in Hamilton’s specifi-
cation, there is no evidence of a month-end effect,
except on the very last day of the month.
Other information about changes in the federal
funds market can also be brought to bear to further
refine the specification. One such change is the
shift to lagged reserve accounting as of July 30,
1998. Partly as a result of this change, the month-
end and settlement-Wednesday volatility of the
funds rate, as well as the overall variance, has
fallen sharply in recent years. Post 1998, the
standard deviation of the last-day-of-month target-
ing error is only 22 basis points (compared with
Hamilton’s last-day estimate of 45 basis points),
and there is no longer any evidence of a settle-
ment-Wednesday spike. That the Federal Reserve
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Figure 2
The Target and Effective Funds Rates, 2002
NOTE: The vertical lines in the top panel denote settlement Wednesdays; in the bottom panel they mark the last day of the month.
4 The parameter estimates are estimated using ordinary least
squares from May 17, 1989, through October 12, 2007, excluding
September 2001 and December 1999.Bank of New York’s Trading Desk has improved
control over the funds rate is readily apparent
in Figure 2. (The vertical lines in the top panel
denote settlement Wednesdays; in the bottom
panel they mark the last day of the month.)
Finally, in refining the estimates of the tar-
geting error process, one would want to make
allowances for special circumstances affecting
the federal funds market. Hamilton already makes
one such allowance, omitting September 2001
from the sample used for estimating the model.
December 1999 should be dropped for similar
reasons: With the Y2K changeover approaching,
the Fed flooded the market with reserves in an
effort to assuage liquidity concerns. Consequently,
the funds rate traded as much as 150 basis
points below its target as the end of the month
approached. Including atypical episodes, such
as this one, could overestimate the amount of
noise normally present in the effective funds rate.
It is important to emphasize that none of these
observations undercuts in any way the soundness
of Hamilton’s basic approach. In particular, I can
think of no reason to suspect that any misspeci-
fication in equations (8) or (9) would necessarily
bias the parameter estimates reported in
Hamilton’s Table 2. Instead, it is more akin to the
problem of choosing inappropriate weights in a
weighted-least-squares procedure: In that case,
while the parameter estimates may not be biased,
the procedure is not making optimal use of the
information contained in the data.
ON INTERPRETING THE
“HAMILTON SHOCKS”
The second part of my remarks concerns the
interpretation of the funds rate shocks underlying
Hamilton’s procedure. By way of background, it
may be useful to distinguish between two different
regimes. In the first regime, changes in the funds
rate target are equally likely on any day—but
changes in the target are not announced by the
FOMC. This regime plausibly corresponds to the
pre-1994 world, in which policy actions were
generally not disclosed and a significant fraction
of rate changes took place between meetings. In
this regime, day-to-day changes in the futures-
implied rate on any particular day would plausibly
represent the market’s inference as to whether the
Fed had changed its target on that day.
In the second regime, which is more relevant
post 1994, the days of the rate changes are
largely known; and even when policy actions are
taken between FOMC meetings, the changes are
announced, and not in response to any specific
news that might have arrived on that day. In this
case, the day-to-day change in the futures rate on
days other than “event” days (i.e., days of rate
changes or FOMC meetings) would reflect changes
in the market’s expectation of the target funds rate
on some future date.
Now consider the sources of news that could
affect policy expectations. One source is new
macroeconomic information: higher-than-expected
employment, for example, or lower-than-expected
inflation. The other source would be changes in
the Fed’s perceived preferences regarding inflation
vis à vis output—the presumed source of mone-
tary policy “shocks,” as the term is commonly
used in the literature.
These distinctions bear on how we should
interpret the information contained in alternative
measures of monetary policy shocks or surprises.
In the second regime, policy surprises (i.e.,
changes in the futures rate) occurring on event
days are more likely to be driven by the second
category of news: changes in the Fed’s perceived
preferences.5 Changes occurring on days other
than event days would, for the most part, be
associated with the arrival of economic news. In
the first regime, however, day-to-day changes in
the futures rate could result from either source:
changes in policy preferences or macro news.
Thus, conditioning on known event days
allows the econometrician to distinguish between
the endogenous response of policy expectations
to new economic information and otherwise
inexplicable policy shocks. This distinction can
be critically important in assessing the financial
market response to monetary policy. As shown in
5 It is also possible that the change would be interpreted as the Fed
reacting to private information, although the evidence for this
view is weak; see Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004).
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reaction to unanticipated funds rate changes is
effectively zero when those changes occurred on
the same day as an employment report, a pattern
that was common in the early 1990s. Any analysis
that failed to make this distinction could provide
a misleading answer to the primary question of
interest to policymakers: how the market will
react to an unexpected change in the fund rate
target.
Within Hamilton’s framework, it would be
easy to make this distinction. In fact, it suggests
an interesting test of the null hypothesis that the
response to (calendar-adjusted) changes in the
futures rate is the same on event days as it is on
non-event days. The alternative, of course, would
be that the reaction differs in a systematic way.
Given the richness of the dataset, it would be
possible to go further and distinguish between
event days and the days of specific economic
news releases (e.g., inflation, employment, gross
domestic product). This assumes that the relevant
days are known, of course—but after 1994, this
is not such a bad assumption. Econometrically,
the only modification to Hamilton’s procedure
would be to allow the relevant dummy variables
to interact with the slope coefficient in equation
(26).
CONCLUSION
None of these points takes away from the
bottom line: The paper is a classic Hamilton time-
series tour de force. It addresses an important
question using elegant econometrics, and it incor-
porates a detailed knowledge of the market for
federal funds. Using more of that knowledge to
refine the targeting-error specification would
enhance an already fine paper, as would further
efforts to understand what the shocks in the
model really represent.
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